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ABSTRACT 
Reading in a public place and realising that the newspaper or book is also of 
interest to a casual observer is not a new phenomenon.  While the term 
‘Shoulder surfing’ is used in the context of this situation in the days of 
mobile computing, its antecedence in times of reading physical media.  
However, the development of both mobile computing and widely available 
internet connectivity means that the variety of documents available for 
casual observation has increased.  
This research demonstrated that sensitive material is viewed, and therefore 
displayed, in public places where they could be seen by unauthorised 
viewers, or shoulder surfers.  Experimentation demonstrated that with the 
development of mobile technology not only are these documents visible to a 
casual observer, they can be duplicated by a smartphone camera and 
thereby leaked.  This risk should, therefore, be considered by any 
organisation whose staff work on potentially sensitive information outside 
the protected corporate environment.   
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Section 1 
1.0 Introduction 
Many of the security risks that beset our computer age have their roots in 
previous times.  Nigerian ‘419' scams are similar to chain mail letters that 
were quite common, ensnaring the over-trusting .  A person in trouble, or 
even needing help to share a fortune, are all hooks that 
were used to ensnare the unwary into parting with 
money or information before computers and the internet 
made this a quicker, more powerful attack.   
This pre-computing antecedence also applies to 
‘shoulder surfing’, or reading over someone’s shoulder 
when the reader does not want them to. This painting 
was created in 1768 by Joseph Wright of Derby and shows the old man 
reading the girl’s letter, a perfect demonstration of shoulder surfing that 
significantly preceded mobile devices.  
The difference between this intrusion and the modern manifestation, 
whereby the display screen of a mobile device is observed or even 
duplicated using the camera implicit with modern smartphones, is the 
amount of information that can be observed, and the potential for it to 
involve sensitive information.    
 
Figure 1.1  ‘A girl 
reading a letter with 
an old man reading 
over her shoulder’ by 
Thomas Wright of 
Derby c1768 
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1.1 Background  
When this research began in 2011 mobile working involved carrying papers 
or, for the digitally inclined, a laptop with documents on a USB drive or CD.  
This required pre-planning to ensure that the user had access to the 
documents.  While email and remote access were available, it was 
significantly less reliable outside the working environment. Tablet devices 
with no USB or CD drive, limited memory storage, and less functionality in 
dealing with the documents than was possible on a desktop or laptop, they 
were best for reading and interacting with the Internet.  So, long-form work 
was generally done on laptop or paper.  Laptop working is much easier 
where there is a surface on which to work.  While people using mobile 
devices today might still prefer to have a table to work on, such as is 
sometimes available on trains, the size of their device makes it less 
necessary. 
In considering the potential risk of shoulder surfing for the modern mobile 
worker, a significant problem requires consideration.  Unlike the theft of 
papers or devices, the observation, or capture of the image of a document 
using a camera or other device, leaves no trace.  Unless a leaked document 
is made public and had a very restricted distribution, it would be 
challenging to identify shoulder surfing as the attack vector used.  
Much research in the area of shoulder surfing concentrates on the capture of 
authentication, so capturing the access PIN onto a device or to a bank 
account at an ATM.  This sort of attack can be easier to track as the 
observer would be expected to use the information observed to gain access. 
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When access can be gained through the unauthorised use of the captured 
information, if there are no other threat indicators, such as might suggest a 
technical hack, this can then be recognised as a potential shoulder surfing 
attack.  Another reason for the interest in this area of research includes 
that the authentication attack is on a short capture event.  Even a video 
capture of a PIN session would take only a few seconds.  In that situation, 
different methods of authentication, such as graphical passwords, can be 
used.  Protecting a complete document, or series of documents is harder for 
both research and enable. 
This thesis sets out research work conducted to establish two critical 
elements in a shoulder surfing attack. Firstly, whether sensitive information 
was displayed, in the course of reading, or working, by the user in 
unprotected, public environments.  If such information was found to be 
available for observation by unauthorised people, then that constituted a 
risk to documentation from their display. However, unlike authentication 
observation, which constitutes short form information, long-form 
documentation would be difficult to observe and make an accurate record 
of, without attracting the attention of the user.  Therefore, secondly, to 
examine whether the use of the camera function of smartphones, when 
combined with the quality of the display of the document, was of sufficient 
quality to enable a duplicate of the display document to be made by an 
unauthorised observer, without attracting the attention of the data user.   
If it the research revealed that both material was available for observation, 
and a smartphone camera was capable of duplicating in sufficient quality to 
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be readable, then this would constitute a significant risk to data being 
worked on outside the protected environment of the workplace of the data 
user. 
 
1.2 Thesis Statement. 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that: 
 The combination of mobile working practices, the availability of 
commodity digital devices with high quality (1,334 x 750 pixels) screen 
resolution and commodity image capture technology creates a channel 
for significant information leakage. 
 
1.3 Contribution  
This research focuses on the risk of covert duplication of sensitive business 
information due to staff working in public situations.  The majority of 
academic work considering the shoulder surfing risk concentrates on the risk 
of observation of authentication to a device or a network with restricted 
access.  This work brings a greater understanding both of the prevalence of 
mobile working and the technology enabling the leakage of significant 
business data displayed by the user while they work. 
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Section 2 
2.0 Literature Review  
This chapter presents a review of the relevant literature that comprises a 
background to the concerning issue contained the use of Shoulder Surfing, 
as discussed in the thesis.  The review demonstrates that although shoulder 
surfing is a well-studied topic concerning the leak of authentication 
credentials, the risk of direct business leakage is less well studied. 
The literature review is structured as follows.  Section 1.1 defines key terms 
used in this chapter. Section 1.2. presents existing research regarding the 
risks from shoulder surfing focusing on the specific risk to authentication. 
Section 1.3 examines methods of protection from this risk. Section 1.4 
examines the risk to long-form documentation.  Section 1.5 explains how 
the research conducted in this research develops from existing work. 
2.1 Defining Shoulder Surfing 
Some terms are used within this chapter that benefit from clear definition 
within the context of this research. 
“Shoulder surfing is a form of an observation attack” [1]. The ability to work 
in public places has increased the potential for sensitive information to be 
observed by an unauthorised person. 
Risk is the combination of likelihood and impact. Risk requires a threat to 
exploit a vulnerability causing an impact. If any of these do not exist, there 
is no risk. The evaluation of the likelihood that a shoulder surfer might see 
understand and record sensitive information in a manner that damages the 
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information owner is critical to the evaluation of the acceptability of 
working on that document in a public place. 
2.2 The Risk of Shoulder Surfing 
2.2.1 Understanding Risk  
As identified in the definition above, risk requires a threat that would 
exploit a vulnerability thereby causing an impact. The risk of shoulder 
surfing arises from the observation of sensitive information, such as an act 
of authentication, with the intention to make some use of that information.  
The vulnerability being the input of the PIN in a public place, where an 
unauthorised person might observe the process. The threat is dependent on 
what the authentication protects.  The International Organisation for 
Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission in their 
27005/ 2011 standard [2] defines as risk as:  
"Potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group 
of assets and thereby cause harm to the organisation." 
The potential harm in the case of shoulder surfing, therefore, may be 
personal or organisational. However, the user will be in a better position to 
evaluate risk if they understand both the possibility of the observation of 
the authentication session and the impact that may derive from that 
observation. 
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2.2.2 The risk of Shoulder Surfing authentication by PIN 
Authentication is the process by which a person demonstrates their identity 
in a situation where that identity allows access.  In the context of this thesis, 
the point of authentication is a typical process to be shoulder surfed.  “One 
of the most cited dangers for smartphone unlocking mechanisms are 
shoulder surfing attacks.” [3]. A process by which “a user identifies himself 
to the system by sending a secret password” [4].  If an observer were able 
to use the password to authenticate onto a system or device, there is a 
significant risk of leakage of any protected information to which they have 
gained access. 
Authentication on a device or at an ATM involves generally involves a four-
digit PIN which was chosen because it was believed to have greater 
memorability than a six digit code [5].  While it is possible to have a longer, 
and more complex password for most devices, The possibility that the user 
might be observed during their authentication process and the PIN be learnt 
[6] has attracted much research in recent years. 
Van Nguyen et al. [7] reports the ease with which a PIN can be captured by 
observation, mainly if the observer can be close to the user. Davinson and 
Sillence [8] assert that there is a further step in successful shoulder surfing 
of a PIN, the observation needs to be accompanied with the motivation to 
retain that information. This motivation will help both the retention of the 
information and the implementation of a capture of the card if that is 
required. The use of a busy street situation would also make the capture of 
the physical card straightforward to a practised pick-pocket.  A skimming 
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attack removes the requirement to steal the actual card as the information 
it holds is copied by a device hidden a replaced slot of the ATM.  The 
observation can also be automated with the use of a hidden camera, but the 
same techniques can be used to obscure authentication from either attack 
While PIN authentication is most commonly identified with a computer 
interface,  some locks also use PIN authentication.  This allows access to be 
restricted, as with a standard key, but the composition of the 
authentication, which in a standard key comes from the form of the key 
shape, can be quickly changed if unauthorised entry is suspected. In the 
case of a solid door lock, both key and lock would need to be changed with 
a physical key. However, the use of just four numbers for the PIN in 
standard PIN door locks reduces its defensive potential [9]  
2.3 Protection from the Risk from Shoulder Surfing. 
The shoulder surfing attack can be defended in three ways: 
• The visibility of authentication can be changed. 
• The sophistication of authentication can be changed. 
• The user can be more aware 
Most of the methods identified in this chapter are a combination of at least 
two out of the three 
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2.3.1 Changing the Visibility of Authentication 
Mahansaria [10] suggested that the most effective approach to defence from 
shoulder surfing was a software interface which would mean that both the 
keyboard and any visual feedback should be hidden from a shoulder surfer.  
One alternative already in frequent use with some Apple devices is 
biometrics, in the form of fingerprints. [11] There are limitations with this 
method including difficulty for users with dermatitis [12].  Higher failures 
can be expected with those who may damage the pad of the fingers 
regularly such as joiners and plumbers.  The damage can mean their 
fingerprint too corrupted for comparison. The Apple Corporation in 
launching this form of authentication on their phones in 2014 claimed that 
not only would this method render the authentication process invisible to 
shoulder surfers, but would also encourage the selection of more complex 
passwords as the burden of accurate recall was removed. [13]. However, 
Charapau et. al.[14] found no signification correlation between the use of 
biometrics and the complexity of passwords selected by users. 
Other methods of authentication designed to resist a shoulder surfing attack 
include a ‘Brain to Computer’ Interface [15], aural authentication, which 
required a selection of sounds [16], a tactile interface [17], magnetic and 
gestural [18] and an interface devised by De Luca et. al.[19] that used both 
the display and the reverse side of the device as interfaces. 
Lin, Oliver and Yan [20] noted  
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“Graphical password schemes take advantage of the fact that our memory 
is significantly more efficient at storing and recalling images than it is for 
(syntactically or semantically meaningless) alphanumeric strings.”   
Lin further developed the system called ‘Draw a Secret’[21] which required 
the drawing of a shape on an input screen.  Lin increased the security 
through coding the of the software.  Testing demonstrated increased 
security without significantly increasing authentication failure, over non-
graphic PINS. 
Zhao, Ahn and Seo [22] used a ‘Picture Gesture' method.  This meant that 
participants selected both a background picture and ‘Points of Interest' in 
that picture.  Researchers reported 54.3% of participants felt that that 
method was more vulnerable to shoulder surfing or a ‘Smudge Attack' when 
the greasy residue from the impact of a finger on a screen shows the area 
most contacted.  This feedback would impact the usability of the 
methodology and was, therefore a disappointing result. Eiband et al. [23] in 
his work on protecting texts.  These being a short form like PINs was felt to 
be potentially vulnerable in a similar way.  Ultimately their system was 
handwritten and converted to formal text out of the sight of the user and 
any shoulder surfer.  Tests showed that handwriting was harder for 
observers to read, especially if they were not familiar with the handwriting 
of the user. 
However, Tari, Ozok and Holden [24] believed the inherent success of the 
graphics password was due in part to their visibility as well as memorability 
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so it could even be shoulder surfed including on reflective surfaces in public 
such as a bus window.  
Zakaria [25] looked for a balance between usability and security and 
developed ‘Line Snaking'.  In this system, the line drawn by the user was 
visible for a short time.  Another approach to usability was devised by 
Yamamoto, Kojima and Nishigaki [26].  They recognised that a significant 
issue with the use of a graphics interface that required the user to select 
one, or more, images from a grid which couldn't be used on a small mobile 
device.  The separate pictures were compiled as a slide show so the user 
could go through at speed, making observation harder.  However, they 
admitted that this would not defeat a situation where the event was 
recorded digitally.  Jenkins [4] used user familiarity as the extra element. 
Using a range of images of the same people these would be familiar to the 
user, but not a shoulder surfer. However, the weakness of this system is 
that close friends or family might have a shared knowledge of the faces 
used for selection.     
Brostoff and Sasse [27] tested the ‘PassFace' a different graphical interface 
over a period, with a particular focus on the success of authentication after 
a period of not doing so. They found that after an average break of 5.4 
months break the rate of recall of a PassFace authentication was twice as 
successful as for a password, with a similar usage rate before the break. 
Besides the usual concerns about shoulder surfing the session, there was an 
added problem with this system in that the PassFace authentication took 
significantly longer than that of a password.  However, it was felt that this 
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would reduce problems such as the rate of calls to an organisation IT help 
desk or ISP after a holiday break could increase by up to 60%.  The time that 
would lose for those unable to successfully remember their password is 
likely, in those situations, to be longer than the time needed to 
authenticate using PassFaces. 
Seng, Ithnin and Mammi [28] prioritised usability in their creation of a 
graphical interface.  Their methodology was relatively complex with a 
choice of three routes to authentication, each having several steps.  In 
testing, they found that users did not take long to learn the approach they 
favoured and, using that, authenticate, even after a period of inactivity on 
the system.  It was not until they were satisfied that their approach was 
going to produce a usable system, that they then turned to ensure the 
protection from shoulder surfing was sufficient.  Faily et al. [29] noted the 
delicate balance between usability and security and the challenges of 
designing software that satisfies both requirements. To see. They confused 
the visibility by having many cursers on the screen at the same time.  The 
user would know which was ‘live' but the observer would not.   
There is, however, a problem with graphical passwords.  In many instances, 
participants reported a slowing down of authentication.  In some cases, this 
may be due to a need to learn, and this may speed up, in others the speed 
was inherent in the method of authentication.  The slowing down of this 
process was not generally popular [30] In Kumar et al.'s work on gaze-based 
authentication [31] removed any visible interface, thereby creating a 
method that would defend against shoulder surfing.  However, while 
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participants were happy with the software practice was needed to use it 
with an acceptable level of speed. Most felt it was unlikely they would be 
able to gain the speeds that they would in a standard keyboard PIN set-up. 
This concern with speed moves attention to the usability of different 
authentication methods.  If a method got in the way of achieving task the 
participant needed to both understand and accept that the risk was 
significant enough to be worthwhile losing some ease of work. If a keyboard 
were non-standard, that would make it harder to guess the keys from the 
positions of the fingers [32].  However, the speed of use can be expected to 
slow, at least in the short term, while the user learns the new layout. [33] 
It should be noted, however, that the participants in some research, for 
example [16] were all computer science undergraduates and so would more 
familiar with the use of technical applications than a user outside an 
academic environment.   The pool from which it is most convenient to draw 
participants tends to be that with the academic has ready access to, which 
will often be technical students.  While this does not invalidate the results,  
it does mean that elements such as the speed of learning a new approach, 
may be faster in the experimental situation than it might be in outside the 
laboratory. 
The sort of education or training required is generalised as part of Security 
Awareness education. In this, the user needs to be made aware of both their 
responsibilities concerning the information they handle and requirements 
that come from that responsibility. They need to understand the risk of 
shoulder surfing [34].  Where that education is ineffective, and the users 
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remain ignorant or unconvinced, then they are less likely to change 
behaviour. [35]  [36] 
There is a significant step in the change in behaviour which was first 
identified by Gundu [37] that states there is a phase of behaviour training 
called ‘Behavioural intent' which denotes that while user understands that 
their behaviour needs to change, they may not be strongly convinced.  In a 
situation of authentication, any intention to change may not survive the 
pressures and distractions surrounding the process, the behaviour thereby 
remaining unchanged.  Of course, that assumes that there was some method 
of enforcement, which with behaviour outside the workplace, may not be 
easy. This also puts the requirement on the designers of the security 
defenders to design the tools and processes in such a way to be most 
effective and least restrictive on the work the user feels they need to do. 
[38] If it takes twice as long to authenticate onto their device then that may 
mean they turn off the authentication requirement in order to reduce the 
time loss. [39] 
Indeed, even where a user accepts the importance of a change in behaviour, 
they may not follow through with behaviour.  Thompson [40] in his PhD 
research experimented with a large-scale event for information security 
professionals in 2009.  After canvasing delegates regarding their perception 
of the impact of privacy screens on protection from shoulder surfing a point 
in the event when shoulder surfing had been discussed Thompson and his 
team observed a situation where delegates could access the internet from 
protected or unprotected screens.  80% of participants expressed a 
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preference for protected screens but only 35% selected to use protected 
computers. 
Another method of having a screen hidden from a shoulder surfer is to use a 
proximity alert.  These identify that if the face of an unauthorised person 
appears to be facing a screen the user of the device is warned, and they can 
activate a screen protector. [41] [42].  This solutions, however, requires the 
understanding and co-operation of the user.  If it is a busy environment, 
then the alerts may become disruptive if the user is not able to change their 
position to, for example, a seat with their back to a wall. 
Payne and Edwards [43] recognised that another feature of newer 
smartphones, a password manager, allows more complex passwords and 
authentication to websites as well as keeping the authentication 
information invisible. However, this does require that the authentication to 
access the static or mobile device have strong authentication or an 
unauthorised person could be free to access those sites. 
Thus far we have been examining the impact of risk on authentication and 
how the process of authenticating can be redesigned to reduce that risk.  
Due to the nature of authentication, the risk is concentrated on a 
momentary event.  However, not all shoulder surfing is concerned with a 
single act of authentication. 
 Before computing became mobile, a shoulder surfing act would almost 
always be a physical observation, rather than a technical attack.  In this 
broader consideration of the shoulder surfing risk, it is therefore essential 
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to include shoulder surfing that targets books or papers, as well as 
documents on computers and devices.  This shoulder surfing of larger 
amounts of information is known as Long Form Observation.  
2.3.2 Risk to Long Form Documentation  
That means that defence has to be more persistent because not only will 
screens be visible for longer, but the user may be more involved or 
concentrated on their work.  Sweller [44] described the phenomenon of 
‘Cognitive loading’ which refers to the extent to which the mind is absorbed 
in a core function, such as working on a document.  There is a limited 
amount of ‘cognitive bandwidth' [45] to spare being aware of someone 
shoulder surfing the user's device.  Because of the more extended display in 
comparison to that with authentication defences have also to be more 
persistent.  One example of that is the use of physical filters or privacy 
screens which restrict the range of visibility so those not directly in line 
with the user would not be able to see the screen, or would have a 
diminished quality of the image.  [46] [47] Participants in experiments 
involving screens felt that the physical nature of defence gave re-assurance 
of privacy.    
Hillson [48] calls risk  
"An uncertainty that if it occurs could affect one or more objectives." 
In the case of shoulder surfing, any visible information, not only the 
authentication but potentially the operation that occurs after access is 
granted.  While authentication may be the critical point in the interaction 
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with an ATM, with other contacts with a bank, especially on a mobile device,  
the authentication may be a means of accessing processes or documents 
that might be of further interest.  
A problem with long-form shoulder surfing can be demonstrated with 
reference to the definition used at the top of this chapter,  
 "Risk is the combination of likelihood and impact. Risk requires a threat to 
exploit a vulnerability causing an impact. If any of these do not exist, there 
is no risk." 
Unlike observing an authentication act that could be used to gain access 
that otherwise would be denied to the attacker; it is harder to identify 
when the information they are displaying has been duplicated or 
photographed.  In some circumstances, potential impact can be calculated 
such as 
In an experiment [49] participants were given a series of scenarios in a 
workshop environment to see if they could identify behaviour in public that 
might risk the leaking of information.  However, in work conducted by 
Agudelo et al. [50] found that while some behaviour taken with sensitive 
documents in a public area might be intentional, the result of the user 
balancing cost to security against the benefit of working, much was 
accidental. For example, if someone was working on some entirely none 
sensitive document, and a document came in by email, and it was opened to 
be read.  That second document might be sensitive, but that display and the 
potential leak would be accidental. 
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Mitchell [51] devised a solution that involved replacing sensitive words in 
documents with other words that would not attract attention, or that would 
make the information less meaningful.  While this approach would protect a 
document with sensitive material, it took time to build the ‘dictionary' or 
replaced words that meant that the cost-benefit analysis would make it 
difficult to justify regarding the time needed to build the use. 
In most cases, however, it is not possible to link impact to a document 
displayed because there is no way of recording image capture. So that 
element is not present.  It is important to consider that in most cases 
shoulder surfing is spontaneous, the result of boredom or opportunism [52].  
This apparent lack of risk can be interpreted as a positive encouragement to 
defend because if the opportunity to see a document or authentication 
there is no motivation to find a way to gain visibility.  However, it also 
makes it harder to identify where risk might be and how successful might be 
any defence, especially against long-form shoulder surfing. 
Because impact is unknown, then the likelihood is also unknown because if a 
document is seen, or duplicated using a digital device, it may be that this is 
never known. So while there is a potential risk, it is harder to quantify 
because there is little chance of a recognisable impact. 
For this reason, it might be reasoned that there is little or no risk of 
shoulder surfing from working in a public place.  However, with the increase 
in the use of application interfaces with financial institutions such as banks 
and for retail purposes increasing the opportunity for users to conduct 
transactions in a public space.  Together with an increase in smartphone 
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ownership worldwide predicted, in one analysis [53], to exceed 5 billion by 
2020, concern as to the risk of shoulder surfing of device use remains a 
concern. Furnell [54] states that the user community for mobile devices 
should be regarded as effectively, everyone.  
While, as stated above, the risk to data of mobile working is still one that 
would be difficult to calculate definitively, it is possible to gain a valuable 
insight which could raise understanding of the overall risk of shoulder 
surfing.   
2.4 Summary 
The research presented in this thesis examined the risk of long-form 
documentation from working in a public place.  In order to do this 
information will be gathered with regards to the prevalence of working on 
sensitive material in public spaces; and whether a smartphone can capture a 
useable image of the data observed. 
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3.0 Experimental Work 
3.1 Observation Log Experiments 
The objective of the overall observational experiment  
In endeavouring to gain an understanding of potential risk to sensitive data 
from mobile working it was necessary to it was essential to gain an insight 
into the way people work in a public environment.  The research was 
carried out in two stages, a pilot stage using physical forms for reporting 
observations, followed by a full operational experiment. 
3.1.1. Observation exercise - Pilot  
While it is not common to include the work undertaken in a pilot phase as a 
separate activity within the experiment, in this case it is included due to its 
importance in testing the experimental design led to the degree of 
protection of ethics as was intended.  
Ethics Committee reference CSE00805 
Objective 
The pilot stage was crucial because it enabled the gathering of feedback on 
the methodology used in order that changes could be made, with new ethics 
approval if required, before embarking on the main experiment. 
Participants  
Six volunteers were recruited initially by a direct approach from the 
researcher. The group comprised of a retired person and a person who in 
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the hospitality industry with the remaining office-based professionals, 
mostly in small firms. 
Experimental Design 
Two critical elements comprised the operation of the experiment; the 
approach of the participants in collecting observations, and the recording of 
those observations.   
It was essential that each participant was fully aware of the ethical 
concerns surrounding the gathering of observational data.  Key to those 
concerns was that no information be recorded, or otherwise retained, 
concerning the detail of the information they observed. It was also essential 
that reports contained only incidents that took place in a public 
environment.   
The reason for, and methodology of, the experiment was discussed with 
each participant.  It was critical that they fully understood the 
requirements of participation in the experiment before they signed the 
consent form.  Each participant was provided with a briefing sheet 
containing the researcher's email address and phone number in the event of 
any queries.    
The Observation Log 
Each participant was issued with an observation log [Appendix One] and 
careful instruction as to its use.  The Observation Log was designed to 
provide space for each of the identified categories of interest.  However, 
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there was limited additional space to discourage observers from recording 
detail of the information observed.  
Experimental Period 
The pilot ran for six weeks from October 2010. 
Results from the Pilot 
Some significant findings came from the pilot exercise: 
• A wide variety of display media were used, including paper. 
• Some leakage involved indiscrete conversations.  
• Some Hot Spots, or areas where the leakage seemed to be higher, were 
identified.  
• Observers reported an increased awareness of their potential information 
leaking behaviours as a result of their participation 
• Observers were unhappy with the paper-formatted logs.  They found 
them difficult to carry or find at appropriate moments. 
• None of the logbooks contained any of the actual information leaked.   
• The results and feedback from the pilot were reviewed to inform the 
design of the main experiment.   
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3.2 Observation by Spontaneous Reporting  
 
3.2.1 Ethics Committee reference CSE00806 
 
3.2.2 Objective 
The objective of this experiment was to gain insight into the prevalence, or 
otherwise, of mobile working resulting in the display of potentially sensitive 
information to unauthorised observers. 
3.2.3 Participants 
For this main experiment, the number of participants was increased to 
twenty-five.  The additional participants were office-based professionals.  
They were all known personally to the researcher and had either pro-
actively volunteered when the nature of the research was discussed or 
invited directly. 
One person from the pilot experiment did not continue to the main 
experiment as their life pattern had changed resulting in significantly less 
exposure to the observing target situations, such as commuting on public 
transport. 
Participants were carefully briefed to provide only the following 
information: 
• General circumstances of the leakage 
• General characteristics of the sender- e.g. age and gender 
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• The type of information leaked, e.g. financial, personal or general 
business. 
3.2.4 Experimental  Design. 
The researcher ensured that each participant was fully aware of the 
requirements of the exercise.  Each was given briefing notes [Appendix Two] 
to keep. These contained contact information for the researcher should the 
participant have any questions. They were then addressed to read, clarify if 
necessary, then sign a consent form [Appendix Three] before they were able 
to take part in the experiment.  
The researcher was aware of the following issues when preparing the 
briefing notes, and preparing the participants for taking part in the 
collection of data: 
• The Social Desirability Effect [56] - Participants might make a strong 
effort to find examples of leakage in order to please the researcher.  
The briefing aimed to make a clear point that the absence of examples 
was also a useful result.  
• Observer Bias [57] The interpretation of the relevance of the 
information they encounter. Participants were encouraged to discuss 
any questions or concerns in order to have a clear understanding of the 
requirements of observation and reporting. 
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• Requirement - Participants needed to be aware of what information 
was required. It was also vital that observers did not feel that they 
were expected to ‘spy’ on those they encounter.   
• Ethical Issues - [58]. It was important that participants not be 
encouraged to behave unethically or out with the specific 
requirements of the experiment. The participants were to be clear 
that only circumstances of the leak, and the most general description 
of the nature of the data to be gathered.  
3.2.5 Spontaneous Reporting 
Following feedback from the pilot experiment concerning the use of 
observer logs for recording incidents, it was decided that participants in the 
main experiment would submit reports to the researcher by text or e-mail, 
in a near-contemporaneous time to the event. 
3.2.6 Experimental Period 
The experiment lasted three months from Monday 14th February 2011. 
3.2.7  Results  
Reported examples from both stages of this experiment are compiled to give 
a single set of results.  
1. A variety of methods of data leakage, in a variety of environments, 
was identified. 
2. ‘Hot Spot' areas where information was more commonly leaked were 
notable. 
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3. Those observed appeared oblivious to the monitoring of their 
information. 
4. Observers were uncomfortable with pro-active information gathering. 
5. Observers reported themselves to be more aware of their potential 
information leaking behaviours as a result of participating. 
Twenty-four incidents were recorded.  Although that is not a statistically 
significant amount, the observations indicate the different types of devices 
available to the mobile worker in this digital age. 
Fig 1 shows a majority of leakages involved the overhearing of conversations, 
be they face to face, using a mobile phone or video conversations such as 
Skype. One of the participants, based in Barcelona, reported a situation of 
Figure 3.1 - Leakage by Media Type 
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aural leakage while the user was talking on his mobile phone.  The 
participant was able to understand the aural leakage information because it 
was relevant to his business knowledge area. 
“ It happened at lunchtime. The guy was alone at the table, and it looked 
to me that he wanted to share something... because he was alone. It is 
particularly interesting because it happened in the restaurant just across 
the street from a big telco and he was telling things from that business 
(figures, revenue, strategy,...). I knew some people he was mentioning, but 
because of the situation of the place, potentially other people might have 
been hearing the same. Looked like he was out of a meeting and wanted to 
share how it went... but the sensitive info was told in the phone call.” 
However, visual leakage gives the observer a more extended exposure to 
the information and so potentially recognise its interest. One observer 
reported:  
“The woman (a solicitor) who sat next to me was sprawled everywhere – 
and had a huge A4 ring binder with the information including the case 
number on it.”   
As listed  above one of the critical findings of this exercise was the apparent 
concentration of events in particular locations. 
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Fig. 2, demonstrates that train journeys appear to be a ‘Hot Spot' for 
observations.  Such a clear difference could indicate that information 
leakage was more common at this sort of location.  However, there are 
components of these experiments that should be noted alongside the results.  
For example, there were only 25 observers, 22 of whom were  UK based.  
Train travel, especially in the Central Belt of Scotland is generally the 
quickest public transport between major cities.  The observers, therefore by 
the nature of their daily travel, be more exposed to events happening on a 
train.   
However, this experiment demonstrated that events involving sensitive 
information leakage by working in a public place, do happen. 
An unexpected finding of this experiment emerged from the de-briefing 
interviews.  Almost all of the participants reported that they felt more 
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aware of the shoulder surfing risk and believed that they were taking more 
care about what they worked on and any mitigating actions that might 
protect it.  This reaction was termed, the Awareness Boost Effect.  When 
the participants recognised situations of data leakage, they found examples 
of behaviour which, should they want to protect their data, they should 
avoid. The more they observed, the greater the re-enforcement of that 
avoidance message. 
3.2.8  Discussion 
The findings of these experiments indicated that there was significant 
evidence of staff working on sensitive material while in public places.  The 
development in mobile technology, especially the availability, speed, and 
capacity of connection through the internet via WiFi; means the amount of 
sensitive data a user could have access to while in a public place has 
significantly increased.  
The premise on which this thesis is crafted is that people are working on 
sensitive information in public places and in doing so are presenting the 
potential for shoulder surfing of the information they are reading or 
creating.  The devices on which much of the mobile working is carried out 
have high-quality screens that mean that make the display is clear to an 
unauthorised observer.  The photo capability of smartphones means that 
casual shoulder surfers have the potential capability to copy the information 
they see displayed and use it themselves, or share it with others. 
The visibility experiments that were also carried out as part of this research 
evaluated the display and capture capability; it was the place of these 
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experiments to identify whether people were working public places on 
business data that would be of potential interest to an unauthorised 
observer.    
The limited scale of data collection in this experiment still highlights the 
working that was carried out, especially in places, such as on trains and 
coffee shops, where the availability of both adequate work surfaces and 
Internet connectivity, may contribute to the popularity of such places for 
those who work in public places.   
Unlike the experiment examining the capability of display and capture of 
mobile devices, this observational experiment was not repeated, so there 
are no facts to support speculation of any growth in mobile working.  
However, given the device and Internet connectivity quality increase, it is 
unlikely that the amount of work carried out in such places has reduced.   
3.3 Visibility Experiment 2012 
 
Objective of the exercises 
Research by Eiband et al. [22] determined that a significant amount of 
shoulder surfing is spontaneous. Of such ‘attacks’ many are of ‘long form’, 
that is a document rather than authentication session.  This means there is 
more information for the observer to remember.   However, if the displayed 
document could be photographed, then potential for the information could 
be stored and subsequently shared with more unauthorised people is greater.   
In order to understand this threat, it was necessary to establish whether it 
was possible to capture an image of a displayed document on a mobile 
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device that would be readable from a captured photograph.  This was done 
by carrying out a series of experiments in 2012 and 2016.  While the 
objective of each experiment was consistent, the results of each was 
compiled and analysed separately. 
The main experiment – 2012. Where the refined layout was used to enable 
participants to attempt to capture images using theirs. 
The supplementary experiment -  2012. This tested the utility of a 3M 
privacy screen on the display from an iPad.  
The update experiment – 2016. In this experiment the These two stages 
were carried out in 2012.  The second stage was repeated in 2016 to see the 
impact of the development of both display and photo capture capability 
since the initial work.   
smaller sizes. 
3.3.1  Ethics Committee Reference 300180032  
3.3.2 Experimental design 
Equipment 
•    1 Laptop -MacBook Pro 2008 
•    1Pad 2 
•    One Android tablet device, HFC Flyer 
•    Five smartphones  
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• HTC7 Pro 
• iPhone 3GS 
• iPhone 4 
• Blackberry Pearl 
• HTC Wildfire 
Participants 
Four PhD research students participated in the main experiment, recruited 
as a result of an invitation email sent to all post-graduate students in the 
department. 
Each participant was given an independent briefing before they took part.  
They were also given a briefing sheet to keep and a consent form to sign 
before they participated.  These are attached as Appendixes.   
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Figure 3.3 - Visibility Experiment Layout 
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Methodology  
Each display device as viewed from each of the positions indicated on Fig. 1.  
Each participant captured an image sitting on a chair and standing in front 
at each position. 
The experiment was conducted in a room with an artificial light source, 
ensuring that identical conditions applied to all captures.  
Participants were allowed to adjust focus and capture parameters but put 
under a degree of time pressure to best mimic a live situation.  Fifteen -
minutes was allowed for each participant to complete their screen captures. 
Once complete, volunteers were asked to upload the pictures from their 
device to e e-mailed them to the researcher.  This approach ensured that 
the researcher at no time had physical access to the participants’ 
smartphones. 
The quality of the captured images was evaluated concerning the clarity of 
the letters on the display.  The researcher examined all the images using 
the Apple ‘Photos’ application on a desktop Mac. This approach was used in 
order to obtain some consistency in the subjective evaluation of the clarity 
of the image.   
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3.3.4 Results  
There proved to be little difference between the capabilities of the 
smartphone devices.  Much more variety in the quality of the image came 
from the position of the participant when they captured the images. 
 Smallest visible 
font  
Smallest 
universally visible 
font 
Laptop - Upright 12 18 
iPad - Flat 36 0 
iPad Upright 12 24 
Android - flat 64 0 
Android -upright 24 36 
 
Table 1, shows the headline results.   
Where the tablet device is laid flat, then only those participants on either 
side of the device could capture readable data, and that was no smaller 
than font size 36.  When the privacy screen was in place, it was not possible 
to capture any clear image of the letters on the displayed chart when the 
tablet was laid flat. 
Table 3.1 – Visibility of captured images 
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The examples in Figure 2 are of pictures taken from the same position by 
different devices and different people.  As can be seen, by the quality of 
the pictures, some participants were more familiar with the photo function 
and so were able to focus the picture better, while the participant with 
Phone 3 failed to take a clear picture, even though they were at a position 
that other participants found gave good visibility.   
The judgement of visibility of the captured images was necessarily 
subjective. Therefore, as with the pilot experiment, the same person 
Phone 1 Phone 2 
Phone 3 
Phone 4 Phone 5 
 
Figure 3.4 
Five iPad Captures, Position 1E 
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assessed each image to give some consistency.  iPhoto software was used to 
view the images.  
The results gathered from this experiment indicate that some positions gave 
significantly consistently good positions to capture data from for all five 
devices.  If the capture device is higher than the presenting device, 
generally because the observer was standing, then this has a more 
significant effect on the quality of the captured image than the distance 
between the display and capture devices.   
In the case of two of the devices, the image captured from a laptop 
captured from two seats behind was readable down to 12 point italics, 
providing the participant was standing.  The other three devices produced 
images with visibility down to 18 italics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 iPad Capture Position 2D Standing 
-Flat 
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The least successful photo captures came when the tablet devices were laid 
flat; face up on the table.  Although a standing position was more commonly 
the most successful approach, Figure 3 demonstrates a failure to capture 
any identifiable data.   
 
 
 
 
The Android device had a more restricted field for observation as well as 
being significantly smaller.  The image in Figure 4 is captured from a point 
where other screens were viewable. However, none of the participants were 
able to capture a clear image. While the image displayed on the iPad could 
be identified at this angle, the print was not readable below 24 point font. 
Indeed, of the eight angles taken, two of the photos showed no readable 
image, and three could only be identified at font point 48.  It is unknown 
whether this lack of visible range was deliberate, as a form of privacy 
screen which protected displayed information from unauthorised observers, 
or if it was a reflection of the size and quality of the display screen.  
Figure 3.6 Android Capture Position 1E Standing- Flat 
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The best quality pictures came from captures of the laptop screen. There 
was no option to lay the laptop flat; so all positions were visible to some 
extent. 
 
 
 
The visibility of the upright screen of the iPad2 was unexpectedly good. 
Even in this early version, the captured image was only slightly less visible, 
than the laptop when it was positioned at an angle that closely compared to 
that when being held. The image was clear on both the iPad and laptop 
captures down to font size 12 in three instances.  However, images of the 
italic script were generally difficult to identify on the iPad.  The font size 12 
lines identifiable on the iPad were standard script and bold font.  
Figure 3.7  Laptop Capture Position 3c 
standing 
Figure 3.8 Capture Position 2c sitting 
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3.3.5    Discussion 
This experiment demonstrated that clear and readable copies of material 
displayed on both laptop and tablet devices could be captured using 
smartphones in a range of positions.  This was due to a combination of the 
development of display quality and photo-capture capability. In the case of 
the android device, where the screen was less bright, the range of angle and 
distance at which there was some visibility of the screen was limited in 
comparison with the other two display devices.  As the other displayed 
screens were clear at the same angle, it implies that it was the screen, 
rather than the photographic capability of the smartphones that was the 
cause of the difference in the quality of the data captured.   
3.4 Repeat of the Visibility Experiment 2016 
Additional objective of the Experiment 
As the research for this thesis was completing, it was considered useful to 
conduct a limited repetition of the visibility experiment to update 
understanding of the capability of a current level of smartphone, in this 
case, an iPhone 6S, to capture an image from a display on a smartphone. 
3.4.1 Ethics Committee Reference 300180033 
 
3.4.2 Experimental Design 
Equipment  
1 iPhone 6 with fitted privacy screen 
1 iPhone 6 without a privacy screen 
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Experimental room without direct natural light  
Participants 
This experiment was a small-scale exercise with two devices each used for 
capture and display.  Therefore, only one participant and the researcher 
were required.  The participant was fully briefed and given a briefing sheet 
and signed a consent form.   
Methodology 
The experiment was conducted using same ‘eye chart’ design for display. 
Each smartphone both displayed and captured in turn.  
As both of the devices used in this experiment were iPhone 6s, one with a 
standard screen and one with a privacy screen having the display device 
held most closely mimicked a display and capture in normal, non-
experimental conditions. The capture positions were the same layout 
pattern used in the previous experiment, presented here as Figure 7.  
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The person holding the capturing device was seated the chairs in this 
version of the experiment had higher backs, which was felt to more closely 
mimic the seats on public transport.  The observer was sat in position on 
row one, and standing on rows 2 and 3.  Images were not captured from 
Column C as it this would present the least challenge for either protected or 
unprotected capture.  
The judgements regarding the quality of the image decided using a Likert 
scale which was labelled  1= Unreadable to   5= good quality copy.  This was 
called ‘The Clarity Scale’. The researcher assessed all the photos in order 
bring a consistency of evaluation. 
The same scale was used with both protected and unprotected screens. 
 
 
 
 Column 
A 
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D 
Column 
E 
Row 1   Display   
Row 2      
Row 3       
Figure 3.9 Experimental Layout for 2016 experiment - d 
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3.4.3   Results   
Part One – The Unprotected Screen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results, in Table 2, show that the best images came from positions 
adjacent to the seat where the screen was displayed (position C1).   
 
 
 
 
 Column 
A 
Column 
B 
Column 
C 
Column 
D 
Column 
E 
Row 1 4 4.5  5 4 
Row 2  4 4  4 4 
Row 3 4 3  3 2 
Table 3.2 – Visibility Experiment 2016 - Unprotected. 
Figure 3.10 Unprotected 
display from position A1 
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As can be seen in Figure 8 although the view from the side is somewhat 
limited regarding the view across the screen, the clarity of the text that 
could be seen was quite clear. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9, captured from the position D1 was clear, especially where the font 
was bold.  It is interesting to note that being slightly further away had less 
of an impact on the quality of the captured image than the angle. Where 
the device screen was unprotected, the positions along the back row were 
sufficiently clear to score a ‘4’ on the clarity scale.  
While some of the captures from row three can only be read down to 24 
point font, this would not avoid incidents such as [55] where only the title 
of the Tomb Raider game under development could be read.  The title of 
the game would also give information regarding the environment, and even 
story; the new game would be based around. For this reason, the leak of the 
title was seen as a very significant leak within the video gaming world.  
 
Figure 3.11 Unprotected display 
from standing position D1 
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Part Two – Protected Screen 
The privacy screen fitted to the second display iPhone 6s was designed to 
protect from viewing outside of a radius of 30 degrees from the centre point 
of display, as seen in the manufacturer’s illustration, Figure 10. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 shows the zone of protection mapped onto Figure 10.  This 
demonstrates where the points of clearest visibility could be expected.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Column 
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D 
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E 
Row 1   Display   
Row 2      
Row 3       
Figure 3.13 Experimental Layouts 2016 – 
Protected 
Zone of Protection over-laid 
Figure 3.12- Manufacturer's info-
graphic regarding the zone of 
protection of the privacy screen 
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The patterned squares demote positions where photos of the display screen 
were taken.  As can be seen from Figure 11 B, C & D on Row 3 are within the 
area of protection so that a clear view can be expected from those positions.  
However, A & E on Rows 1 & 2 are outside and therefore can be expected to 
have a low-quality view. 
Results  
 Column 
A 
Column 
B 
Column 
C 
Column 
D 
Column 
E 
Row 1 1 1  1 1 
Row 2  3 3  3 2 
Row 3 3 2  3 1 
 
Table 3 shows that those images captured from the same row as the display 
device showed no readable text.   
The difference between protected and unprotected screen captures was 
from position A1.  Figure 12 compares the photo of an unprotected display 
on the left and the device fitted with a privacy screen on the right.  The 
photo of the protected screen shows it as entirely obscured by the privacy 
screen, which darkens the displayed image. The protective effect is, 
therefore, recognisable.  
 
Table 3.3 Visibility Experiment 2016 Protected 
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Where the capture device is positioned on row 3 the difference in the 
visibility of the information between the protected and unprotected 
positions is less marked. Figure 13 shows photos of the unprotected screen 
(on the left) compared with a protected screen.  The difference is much 
harder to detect as a wider area is within the zone of protection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14 Comparison of the view from position A1 from the  
Un-protected and protected devices screens 
Figure 3.15 Comparison of the view from position D3 on 
unprotected and protected screens 
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As can be seen in the results tables above there was a clear benefit to using 
a privacy screen in defending against shoulder surfing by observers close to 
the user.  It should also be considered that the ‘best’ position, regarding the 
clarity of captured image, is the one that is least likely to be used because 
of the risk of being challenged by the device owner.  The body of the user 
masked the positions immediately behind the display.  This may not have 
been as significant was the person capturing the image not as short as she is. 
Someone closer to 6ft tall is likely to have been able to get better images.  
3.5 Overall Results  
The objective of this series of experiments was to understand the capability 
of the camera that is integrated into current smartphones, to capture 
photos of the display screen of someone working in a public area.  If it were 
possible to make a copy of a document, then the information displayed can 
be shared, more quickly with the use of internet capability.  Alternatively, 
the information can be used to inform a small group of interested people, 
such as a rival organisation. 
The results from the experiment carried out in 2012 showed that especially 
where the display screen was large or clear, an image of sufficient quality 
could be readable from analysis of the photo alone. Especially where the 
observer was close.  Also, where the detail was less important than the 
headline, many positions enabled a readable capture.   
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This visibility indicates the potential risk of information displayed on mobile 
devices.  At the time of this experiment, however, Internet connections 
were less widespread and slower than the current availability.  So while 
reasonable images could be captured, it was less likely they would be 
shared quickly after capture.   
The development of both display and camera capture capability between 
2012 and the repeat of the visibility experiments in 2016 resulted in a 
significantly improved capability of information capture by shoulder surfing.  
This was, to an extent expected, hence the reduction of the size of the 
display by using a smartphone, rather than a tablet or laptop.  However, 
even with the reduction of screen size the quality of the image captured 
from the display screen was not significantly reduced.  This demonstrated 
that concern regarding the risk of shoulder surfing of displayed data should 
apply to all display devices, not just the larger ones.   
The introduction of the privacy screen display in 2016 allowed consideration 
of the mitigating effect of using such a screen.  The results were consistent 
with the claims of 3M, the manufacturer of the privacy screen, in that 
captured images from outside a 30-degree radius were of lower quality, and 
often not sufficiently visible to allow exact reproduction.  However, the 
area within the zone still allowed clear images to be captured.  This meant 
that where the observer was close, but not to the side of the user, a clear 
image could be captured.  This meant that the privacy screen provided 
limited protection, especially in crowded situations such as those familiar to 
those commuting on trains and buses in the commuting peak time.   
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4.0 Summary 
 
4.1 Review of research questions. 
 
The improvements in technology in terms of capability and mobility of 
mobile computers and devices, have enabled working outside of the 
protected environment of the office on a scale not seen previously.  The 
ability of unauthorised observers to see information displayed by someone 
working in a public place has been establish before mobile computing.  
However, the amount and diversity of documents that can be easily read, 
and by that displayed, through working in public places, makes this a 
significant issue for organisations. Especially where the document is not only 
viewed by the observer, but a duplicate is made through the camera 
function of the observer’s smartphone, this is a risk that organisations needs 
to be considered in terms of security threat to data.  However, because 
there is no loss of source document this threat is hard to quantify.   
The purpose of this research was to consider two basic aspects of shoulder 
surfing and duplication.   
Firstly, by observation by experiment participants of incidents of sensitive 
data being on display, it was possible not only to establish that such 
situations do arise, and in countries outside the UK as well as within.  The 
results also identified ‘hot spots’ where it was more common to find 
information displayed.  These included situations where a table was 
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available that could substitute for a desk and thereby make work easier; 
coffee shops and trains being the most common for our participants. The 
results indicated that mobile working is a phenomenon that can be studied. 
The second aspect of shoulder surfing of long-form documentation 
considered the opportunity that high quality display and camera technology 
gives unauthorised observers to not only to see data displayed, but 
duplicate it by photographing it using their smartphone.  An experiment to 
attempt to capture an image from a display device was carried out in 2012, 
and repeated in 2016.  The first experiment demonstrated that it was 
possible to capture a reasonable image from a laptop or a tablet device 
using the smartphones in common use at that time.  A surprising finding was 
that the best position to take a duplication image was not from next to the 
user of the display device, it was from behind, or significantly to the side of 
the device.  This was because of the angle of view and the unease of the 
participant, who felt they would expect to be challenged for taking an 
image from the neighbouring device.  
When this work was repeated in 2016, using a smartphone as both the 
display and the duplicating device, the improvement in both the quality of 
screen and camera meant that it was possible to capture clearer duplicates 
of the document, even from several rows behind.   
This demonstrated that the capability of the smartphone of an observer to 
duplicate documents was routine.  So a casual observer, who chanced to see 
a document of interest would be able to duplicate that document from the 
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distance that they can themselves observe the document, without 
significant risk of being challenged.   
4.2 Limitations 
While much was established due to the work undertaken in this research, it 
is important to be aware of some limitations that need to be considered to 
put the results in context.   
With the observation experiment, this was on a small scale and, although 
international, was limited in the geographic spread of observations, the fact 
that none of the participants declared a problem in finding situations to 
observe.  An important reason for the scale of the work was because of the 
potential ethical issue that could arise if the participants were not clear in 
the methods of reporting of the incidents, and trusted by the researcher not 
to record any of the information seen.  While it would be possible to scale 
up somewhat, the potential increase incidents reported would have to be 
balanced against an ethical risk.   
In considering the visibility experiment this was limited in the sense that it 
was only carried out in the experimental set up.  There was, for example, 
no effect from daylight lighting, or obscuring, the display screen because 
the places used had artificial light as their prime illumination source.  A 
more realistic situation might reveal situations where the nature of the 
environment make it easier, or harder to capture an image.  This would 
obviously be helpful information to anyone creating security training to 
increase the awareness of mobile staff of the shoulder surfing risk.   
 60 
4.3 Issues arising from this research 
 
The initial experiment identified significant instances of mobile work on 
sensitive material in a public environment.  Identifying this work pattern 
was the foundation of this research.   
A further, unforeseen contribution of this experiment was in identifying ‘hot 
spots', such as at a table on a train or at a coffee shop. This knowledge 
alerts to a potential vulnerability to social engineering threat close to public 
organisations' offices looking for information regarding a specific 
organisation could target ‘hot spots' close to that organisation or public 
transport frequented by staff members. 
The second experimental series examined the quality both of the display 
and camera operation of a mobile device.  When the concern is concerning 
business documentation, rather than short session authentication, on a 
device, the observed information is more useful when it is directly recorded 
and, potentially shared.  Examining the duplicated image that could come 
from the combination of both the display and capture devices in both 2012 
and 2016 gives some insight into the increase in image quality, such that in 
2016, rather than the range of display devices used in 2012, only the iPhone 
6s was used.  Even with that restriction, a clear image of the displayed 
information could be captured from positions which would be unlikely to 
raise the suspicion of the display device user. 
As mobile working becomes more accessible with more powerful devices and 
fast Internet connectivity in public places, it is even more critical that 
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organisations evaluate the risk to information of its use in unprotected 
environments.  
4.4 Future work  
The work undertaken in this thesis examines both the existence of the risk 
of covert duplication, and the potential clarity of the images of mobile 
device display screens captured.   
There are further elements that could expand upon this work, and thereby 
provide more comprehensive understanding, and that could provide a more 
in-depth feed into the design and implementation of Security Awareness 
programs to guide staff in more secure mobile working.   
1. A large piece of research work that looks to gather users' 
impressions concerning the shoulder surfing threat.  Problems 
with attempting this exercise would include getting enough 
responses from a range of mobile workers.  Ideally, this would 
include representation for the full range of working aged staff, as 
well as a variety of skill and career groups, as well as of 
organisation types. To collect data from a restricted group of 
participants, such as computer science students, information 
security professionals or government workers, while still useful, 
would be limited in the extent to which findings could be 
extrapolated.  
2. Gather, again for as wide a range of users as possible, information 
regarding the knowledge of users of how they believe they can 
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reduce the shoulder surfing threat, for example by the use of 
privacy screens.  Along with such research work would also need 
to be undertaken to get an understanding of how willing users 
would be to take the mitigating action of which they are aware.  
Finally, it would be necessary to understand how widespread, and 
consistent are the uses of such mitigating actions, and how the 
user makes their risk assessment.  As this would be a self-
reporting exercise, it would be subject to the self-awareness of 
the users, and their willingness to be honest about their 
motivations. 
3. In the UK, as with many other countries, there are a number of 
co-existing cultural groups, it is possible that the attitude of some 
of these groups might vary and it would be useful to gain insight 
into these as well as an understanding of why there might be 
differences. Cultural differences may also exist between 
organisations, especially those who have been operating for a 
significant period. For example organisations in the financial 
sector, and those in the health sector generally have a very 
different approach to mobile working and the protection of 
sensitive data. 
All of the ideas above were considered, to some extent during this research.  
Ultimately it was decided that a firm basis of research into the attack 
vector that is Shoulder Surfing, designed to be as objective as possible, was 
required as a foundation to future, more subjective, work. 
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Not all potential future work would be subjective.  Three potential 
directions for more objective research could be: 
1. Mobile working.  One aspect that is clear from the existing work is 
that as the technology of mobile devices improves, the capability to 
work away from the privacy of an organisational environment will 
continue to increase. In the same way that those concerned with the 
shoulder surfing of an authentication session moved to protection, so 
too with mobile working on long-form business documentation.   
2. Visibility and capture advance. The impact on display quality of 
device screens considered in the work of 2016, by testing display only 
on the screen of an iPhone6s, not a laptop or tablet device.  The 
resulting images were often clear enough for significant information 
to be available to unauthorised observers potentially. However, this 
form of capture still requires an observer to be in proximity to the 
display screen and so there might be a certain amount of caution in 
approaching the displayed screen. 
3. New threat vector.  Further understanding of this risk could result 
from a derivation of the visibility experiment, with images from 
modern CCTV of the quality increasingly common in public transport 
‘hot spots' such as trains and planes.  In the wild, such data collection 
would be vulnerable to not only technical interception but also social 
engineering by compromising the person monitoring the CCTV feeds. 
Where an organisation needs to evaluate their shoulder surfing risks 
than those collected by CCTV, especially in areas where users can sit 
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and work in some comfort, should be undertaken.  However, thus far 
there has been a lack of research in this area. Including good quality, 
CCTV images bring about a more comprehensive view of the shoulder 
surfing risk.  
Research can provide insight and answers, at the same time pointing 
towards further work.  The work carried out for this research is just a 
foundation point from which a range of research challenges could step off.  
Indeed they should move forward because the technology that enables clear 
displays and others that give ever increasing duplication capability, together 
with no sign that mobile working will decrease, means protections need to 
be found, understood and made available to users and their employers as 
soon as possible. 
4.5 Final Thoughts - GDPR 
Now that the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection 
Act 2018 are in place, organisations are required to be accountable for their 
decisions regarding the processing of personal information, including their 
evaluation of risks inherent in the collection of sensitive personal 
information inherent in standard, and reasonably foreseeable, operational 
practice.  The particular element of GDPR that applies to protection of 
mobile working is article 5.1(f), which says that information must be: 
“processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal 
data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and 
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against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical 
or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’).” 
This principle is designed to be able to cover changes in technology involved 
in the processing of data, including mobile devices.  
As GDPR has been enacted for less than six months, there is not yet a body 
of case law to demonstrate the level of fines that can be expected resulting 
from different causes of a data breach, so monetising any threat concerning 
fines can only be done in the broadest terms.  However, any situation which 
involves regularly, or even predictably, if infrequently, working on sensitive 
material in a public environment means that the employing organisation 
needs to demonstrate that all reasonable assessments and actions have 
been taken to protect the data.  This is applicable whether the devices 
which are personally owned by the member of staff (known as 'Bring Your 
Own Devices' or 'BYOD') or by the employing organisation. 
In organisational situations concern for leakage and loss due to mobile 
working generally focuses on the loss of devices and methods of ensuring 
that should the device fall into unauthorised hands they would not have 
access to any sensitive information.  Encryption of information on the 
device is a standard method used to defend against this risk.  This is a 
sensible approach not least because as the Information Commissioner's 
Office has issued significant fines under the previous Data Protection Act, 
and have stated their intention to continue to do so.  However, with risk 
from shoulder surfing, for reasons discussed earlier in this work, it is more 
difficult for the leakage of data to be realised as it is only duplicated, not 
 66 
removed, from the user.  Organisations, therefore, need to have some 
understanding of not only the present risk of shoulder surfing but how can 
be expected to change in the medium term.  Understanding of the risk to 
data held by an organisation is necessary for designing an appropriate 
strategy to protect information from the shoulder surfing threat. 
The research reported in this thesis presents insight for effective risk 
assessment of the threat to sensitive data presented by normal, or 
predictable data processing outside the protected environment.  
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APPENDIX 
1.1 Appendix One –  
The Observation Log  
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1.2 Appendix Two –  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CARRYING OUT OBSERVATIONS  
Observation of data leak in public places  
This project is designed to gather anecdotal evidence of incidents whereby 
data is leaked 1. by the behaviour of the business person when working in a 
public space.  
2. This project attracts no funding as there is no additional expense as 
observers are making the observations in the course of their ordinary 
business.  
3. Observers are people who I know personally or, after hearing about my 
research, volunteer to help and are then contacted personally by me; many 
are information security professionals. I currently have 18 volunteers, of 
which 4 are based outside the UK.  
4. Observers are briefed carefully, and are given a briefing note as a 
reference document as it is important that they understand the requirement 
for information and the strong boundary of that requirement.  
Participants e-mail incident reports of situations they witness. The 
information requested is:  
The general location e.g. country, city, town   
The gender of the ‘leaking’ person   
The approximate age of the ‘leaking’ person   
Where the incident happened   
The form of information- e.g. Paper, Phone call , Laptop working, Paper , 
Other   
The nature of the information- e.g.  Financial, Personal , Business 
sensitive, Other   
Any other relevant information    
It is important to remember that the purpose of this report is to record 
incidents that are encountered passively; that is no special effort is made to 
be in able to overhear or see events of interest.  
You should not actively attempt to shoulder-surf or collect data in any 
other way.   
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5. Participants make observations when they witness suitable incidents and 
they feel it is appropriate for them to do so. Participants are told that there 
is no requirement for them to report incidents. If they witness no incidents 
in the period of the study then that is perfectly acceptable.    
56 There are two ethical issues which are strongly addressed in the design of 
this exercise  
Participants must not activity try to receive leaked information, for 
example by moving next to someone so they can see the documents they 
are working on.  
No actual sensitive information must be gathered in the course of the 
observation.  
The widespread use of portable technology means that observation reports 
are often made close to the time of the incident so feedback, and guidance 
if necessary, can be given quickly if necessary. At this point there have been 
no reports that contained any sensitive data. This is likely because of a 
combination of careful briefing and that many of the volunteers are 
information security professionals so are familiar with the ethical issues.  
From time to time the project is discussed with participants and their 
feelings and attitudes to the work are monitored, recorded where 
appropriate. All observation reports are anonymised as are any records of 
interviews held with participants.  
7.  Most the incidents involve business people, a few have been private 
people releasing personal sensitive data, generally financial. No incidents 
involving children or people with reduced ability to understand the risks 
involved in handling any kind of sensitive information are relevant or 
appropriate to this study.  
8. . No payment is made to participants  
9. . No active recruitment is proposed. Volunteers have, thus far, come 
forward when the nature of the research has been explained in a 
conversation or in a conference presentation. Volunteers can, at any time, 
actively withdraw by contacting the researcher directly. They can also 
choose not to submit reports should they feel unable to do so and they will 
not come under any pressure to do so. However, those who withdraw may 
be contacted to explain why they did so.  
Participants in the first smaller phase, participants were contacted as 
described above. The conditions were made clear and a briefing sheet was 
issued. For the second phase it is proposed to have them sign a consent 
form to say they have had the conditions explained to them and agree to 
participate under the conditions set out. Also, that they understand that 
their reports will be anonymous and anonymised.  
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10.. The proposal meets all requirements of the BPS code of conduct and 
the ESRC framework of research ethics.  
11. No name, either of the participant or of the person or company involved 
in the leaking incident is recorded on the incident sheets or on any other 
document  
12. Stage one, a small pilot study with a few participants who were almost 
all locally based, began in October 2010. It is proposed to commence stage 
2, using adi in March 2011.  
13 Location will be various as observers move around in the course of their 
normal life.  
14. At the end of the gathering stage of the project participants will be 
contacted to discuss the work they have done and to be thanked for their 
efforts. When the results are written up they will have the opportunity to 
see them and enter into a dialogue about them if they are interested in 
doing so.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
1.3 Appendix Three 
 Observation Project 
 
Consent form 
 
 
Thank you for volunteering to help with my project. 
 
It is important to this research, and to the privacy of those you may 
encounter in your travels, that you understand the requirements of this 
work, and for that reason I have communicated with you personally 
regarding your help. 
 
If at any time you have any questions, or feel you are no longer able to 
assist me then withdraw by notifying the researcher directly.   
 
Please note, there is no problem with you withdrawing.  This is a voluntary 
project. 
 
I have 3 key guidelines that I need to put before you one more time because 
they are a vital part of my research 
 
1. The incidents you report must be of information that is leaking so 
openly that you do not have to make a special effort to overhear 
or oversee the information. 
2. You should not actively attempt to shoulder-surf or collect data in 
any other way. 
3. The leaked information should not be recorded. 
 
 
  Once you have read these guidelines, and received any clarification you 
require, please sign the bottom of this sheet to indicate that you agree to 
these requirements and then e-mail the sheet back to me.  
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That will indicate that you are ready to begin. 
 
 
I am willing to participate and agree to the guidelines  
 
 
Name………………………………………………… 
 
 
Signature…………………………………………….. 
 
 
Please enter your e-mail address below if you wish to have a summary of the 
outcome of the study once it is complete. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………. 
 
If you have any questions please contact me at wendy@idrach.com 
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